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It is common to ask whether populism is a threat or a corrective to democracy. In the empirical 
literature, the conclusion tends to be that it is both. Some normative accounts, most notably those of 
Laclau and Mouffe, promote populism because of its alleged ability to deepen and recover democracy. 
Both of these strands of the literature are inhibited by an observer perspective, which means that they 
evaluate populism as a phenomenon that affects democracy from the outside rather than as an 
alternative set of ideas about democracy. This paper proposes an alternative approach to populism, 
which uses the publicity condition first suggested by Kant and later expounded by Rawls. The 
publicity condition entails taking a participant perspective, where you regard yourself as involved 
with plural others in a common enterprise of deliberation, choice, and action. While the observer 
considers the causes and effects of different doctrines in order to observe, explain, manipulate and/or 
exploit political practice, the participant asks whether we could make a doctrine our own, as 
something we would want to promote for others and ourselves, as well as use to assess the health of 
our democracy. 
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I. Introduction 
Being concerned with populism and democracy, it is tempting to ask, “Is populism 
democratic?” However, formulating the issue this way is ambiguous and may be misleading. 
Indeed, we may be asking two very different questions. (1) Does populism have 
democratizing effects? (2) Is populism inherently democratic? Conflating these questions 
leads not only to bad theory but is also politically dangerous. This is the case, because the 
conflation potentially entails two fallacies. The first fallacy is the proposition that if 
populism can have democratizing effects, then populism is democratic. The second fallacy 
is the proposition that because populism can have democratizing effects, then democrats 
ought to promote populism. Both of these notions are non-sequiturs; the latter parts of the 
two propositions do not follow from the former parts. The danger of failing to understand 
the difference between the contingent democratizing effects of some forms of populist 
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movements and populism’s inherent features lies in that you may promote a form of 
politics, which you do not endorse on its own terms. What you praises for its contingent 
effects may, if it succeeds on its own terms, have the long term effect of undermining the 
primacy of what I call the participant perspective, which is essential for democracy. 
In the empirically oriented and historical literature, it is common to ask whether 
populism is good or bad for democracy. The answer is often that it can be both (Kazin 
2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; 2017, 79-96; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Some 
normative accounts, most notably those of Ernesto Laclau (2005) and Chantal Mouffe 
(2018), promote populism because of its alleged ability to deepen and recover democracy. 
Both of these strands of the literature take what I call an observer perspective on the 
relationship between populism and democracy. This means that they evaluate populism as 
a phenomenon that affects democracy from the outside rather than as an alternative set of 
ideas about democracy. The consequence is that populism is assessed with standards that 
are external to populism itself, such as inclusion and pluralism. The main downside of this 
approach is that it fails seriously to interrogate and evaluate the ideas and norms promoted 
by populism itself. Moreover, it creates ambivalence regarding the question of how 
populism is assessed and valued – as a means or because of its inherent features. 
This paper proposes an alternative approach to the assessment of populism and its 
relationship to democracy, which builds on the publicity condition first suggested by 
Immanuel Kant and later expounded by John Rawls. The publicity condition holds, roughly, 
that doctrines promoted in politics should have the capacity of being communicated to, 
known by, and followed by everyone in society. This means, first, that the doctrine we 
promote in public and the doctrine we use to assess the effects of the former must be the 
same. Second, the public recognition of a doctrine must not frustrate its end.  
The publicity condition, I emphasize, attains its importance from the kind of 
relationship we establish to others by promoting our doctrine. Publicity is necessary (if not 
sufficient) to respect those persons the doctrine affects. In its ideal from, it entails taking a 
participant perspective and regarding ourselves as involved in relations with others who in 
good faith and reasonably may hold different political views than we do. It asks us to 
consider not how a detached observer might look at the causes and effects of different 
doctrines in order to observe, explain, manipulate and/or exploit political practice, but, 
rather, whether we could make a doctrine our own, as something we would want to promote 
for others and ourselves, as well as use to assess the health of our democracy. 
 
II. Populism as a “corrective” 
This section demonstrates how two different strands in the literature on populism – a more 
empirical and a more normative strand – create a similar confusion regarding how to 
evaluate populism in relation to democracy. Both strands suggest that populism can have 
democratizing effects and therefore may be positive and even necessary. The confusion is 
created by an ambivalence, first, as to which perspective we should take in analyzing 
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populism, and second regarding which principles we should use in evaluating populism. 
Should we evaluate populist ideas as participants who consider the inherent merits of 
competing ideologies? Or do we take an observer perspective utilizing a given set of 
standards in relation to which we can assess populism’s effects? One may think that the 
normative strand falls into the first alternative and the empirical strand into the second. 
However, part of my argument is that this is not the case. One should also note that the 
second alternative includes normative evaluation as well (Ochoa Espejo 2015, 60). Thus, 
the question is not whether one uses norms but which norms one uses, where they come 
from, whether they can be justified, how, and to whom.  
“Threat or corrective for democracy?”, ask Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012). In political science as well as in historical studies the answer tends to be 
that populism can have both democratizing and anti-democratic effects. As the historian 
Michael Kazin (2017, xv) puts it, “While populism can be dangerous, it may also be 
necessary.” He thinks populism has been necessary in order for United States, the country 
he studies, to live up to its democratic ideals. Thus, populists have “often performed a 
service to the nation” (Kazin 2017, xv). While this strand of the literature sees populism as 
capable of democratizing society and giving a voice to the otherwise excluded, it also notes 
that this positive effect is realized only under certain conditions. Thus, Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012: 209) end an anthology of studies of populism in Europe and the Americas 
with the conclusion that populism mainly has democratizing effects when in opposition. 
When populists attain governmental power and are unchecked by strong (non-populist) 
institutions, they become a threat to democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 212). 
One problem for the empirical and historical literature is that it is unclear which 
standards should be used in the assessment of populism. In other words, to which 
conception of democracy is populism a threat or a corrective? Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012, 217-18) acknowledge that this is a problem, especially because populism 
changes the meaning of democracy. However, they offer no solution to the problem and 
continue to list positive and negative effects of populism on democracy (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017, 79-96). The solution here is not simply to choose a conception of 
democracy to assess populism in relation to, such as liberal democracy (as Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2017 do). Nor is the solution to assess populism in relation to a chosen 
nation’s democratic ideals (as Kazin does). The deeper problem lies in treating populism as 
an independent and external cause, which may have either positive or negative effects on a 
given dependent variable, the health of democracy.1 Taking an observer perspective, this 
approach places the intrinsic nature and value of both populism and liberal democracy 
                                                          
1 Benjamin Moffitt (2016, 133, 139-41, 149-50) also criticizes the approach that sees populism as 
an external cause affecting democracy positively or negatively, but his own suggestion of examining 
“the democratic and antidemocratic tendencies within populism” suffers from the same problem of 
unclarity regarding which standards are used to deem something democratic and antidemocratic. 
4 
 
outside discussion. This is not only normatively problematic; it also impedes understanding. 
The shortcoming in saying that populism corrects liberal democracy is that it is not 
something that the populist can recognize as her own goal as a populist. To be precise, one 
cannot be said to speak in favor of populism by praising its positive effects on liberal 
democracy, insofar as populism entails and promotes a competing conception of democracy 
(Mounk 2018; Müller 2016; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2019). If we are truly to take populism 
seriously, we should discuss the inherent merits of its interpretation and transformation of 
democracy and not only judge its effects on a given, non-populistic conception of 
democracy. 
On this issue, we might expect to obtain help in political theoretical treatments of 
populism. We find an influential affirmative approach to populism in the work of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. It is not always clear when their work is ontological and when 
it is normative. Thus, Laclau (2005, 67) claims that populism is part of “the ontological 
constitution of the political as such” and that all politics is populist. However, both Laclau 
and Mouffe promote politicization, which for them entails advocating populism. In her recent 
book, Mouffe argues For a Left Populism (2018). In the following, I focus on Mouffe’s recent 
work, but occasionally also include references to Laclau when pertinent.2 Laclau and Mouffe 
are of relevance also because of their influence on and cooperation with (left) populist 
politicians, such as Pablo Iglesias and Íñigio Errejón from Podemos in Spain and Jean-Luc 
Mélonchon from La France insoumise and presidential candidate in 2017. Mouffe’s 
cooperation with these parties makes her a participant and, as she says, a “partisan” (2018, 
9). However, this does not mean that she takes the type of participant perspective, which I 
argue is required by the publicity condition. 
According to Mouffe, populism is a discursive strategy, which can take different 
ideological forms. She promotes a form of left populism, which she argues is needed to 
shatter the “consensus in the centre” and the “post-politics” of neoliberalism (Mouffe 2018, 
12-24). Through the populist strategy of constructing a frontier between “the people” and 
“the oligarchy,” she holds that it is possible to “recover and deepen democracy” (Mouffe 
2018, 5, 24). Mouffe, then, writes in favor of populism because she wants a deepening and 
radicalization of democracy. But what exactly does that mean? Can left populism help us 
understand the meaning of this end, or is it merely an external means to an independently 
given end? 
In her recent book, Mouffe emphasizes that she is not in favor of a revolutionary 
break with liberal democracy. The radicalization of democracy that she favors, and which 
left populism should deliver, is a radicalization of the principles of a liberal democratic 
regime, “liberty and equality for all” (Mouffe 2018, 36-40, 48-49). Thus, “the objective of a 
left populist strategy is not the establishment of a ‘populist regime’ but the construction of 
                                                          
2 Laclau and Mouffe have co-authored Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) but written separately 
on populism (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2018). 
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a collective subject apt to launch a political offensive in order to establish a new hegemonic 
formation within the liberal democratic framework,” and to “foster the recovery and 
deepening of democracy” (Mouffe 2018, 80, 51). This position requires that populism 
brings no distinctive ideas and values with it but is solely an immanent attempt to bring 
liberal democracy back to its own commitments (recovery) or to more fully realize its 
principles (radicalization and deepening). However, I shall suggest that populism both in 
actual politics and in Mouffe’s formulation actually does bring with it a set of ideas and 
values, which cannot be combined with a liberal democratic framework. The issue of 
populism is about liberal democracy and cannot be contained within its framework. 
Mouffe accepts Laclau’s idea that populism entails dividing society into two camps, 
“the underdog” and “those in power,” or “the people” and “the oligarchy” (Mouffe 2018, 
10-11, 5; Laclau 2005, chap. 4). This fits with the common understanding of populism in 
the literature, which is that the core feature of populism is that it regards society as divided 
into two qualitatively different and antagonistic camps, the people and the elite.3 When 
populists speak of “the people,” they do not speak of all the members of a polity, as liberal 
democrats do, but use a pars pro toto logic, where a part stands for the whole (Arato 2013, 
156-66; Müller 2014, 485, 490; 2016, 25-32, 98). Laclau (2005, 81) is blatant about this: “The 
‘people’ … is something less than the totality of the members of the community: it is a 
partial component which nevertheless aspires to be conceived as the only legitimate 
totality.” This construction is by no means innocent, empty, or formal but carries with it 
substantive normative content. In particular, it carries with it the idea that the views of the 
opponent cannot be legitimate. In populism, those who differ from “the people” must be 
corrupt and self-serving and “cannot be a legitimate part of the community” (Laclau 2005, 
86). Thus, it is difficult to see how the populist strategy can recognize and combine with 
the fundamental liberal democratic norm of respect for disagreement (Rostbøll 2018). 
As with the empirical and historical studies of populism, in Mouffe, we are left with 
the question of the relationship between the standards promoted by populism and the 
standards of liberal democracy. This problem connects to the fallacy of assuming that just 
because populism can have democratizing effects, it is itself democratic. At least, there is a 
dangerous ambivalence regarding the sense in which Mouffe sees (left) populism as 
democratic. One pitfall is that by treating populism merely as a strategy and a means, Mouffe 
fails to interrogate its inherent qualities. That is, she is insufficiently attentive to populism 
as a doctrine, which carries with it specific ideas and norms, especially ideas regarding who 
belongs to the people and what citizens owe disagreeing others. Another shortcoming is 
that there is no consideration of what happens if the populist strategy succeeds. By treating 
populism as a strategy that can break up an existing consensus, Mouffe only considers its 
                                                          
3 Brubaker 2017, 362; Canovan 2002, 25; Moffitt 2016, 3; Mudde 2017, 29; Laclau 2005, 74-77, 87; 
McCormick 2011, viii, 12, 179, 181. But the antagonistic relationship between people and elite is 
only a necessary, not a sufficient condition, of populism (Ochoa Espejo 2015; Urbinati 2019). 
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effects in the process of challenging the existing order. It is in this process that populism 
creates conflict, politicizes, and includes new voices, and, thus, democratizes in one sense 
of the term. But what happens if a populist movement succeeds? To answer this question, 
we must analyze populism’s inherent ideas about democracy. 
The shared limit of the two strands of writings on populism considered in this section 
is that they treat populism as something that has an external effect on democracy and thus 
ignores populism’s competing ideas about what democracy is and should be. I do not mean 
to say that there can be no value in considering the effects of actually existing populist 
parties in relation to a given conception of democracy. Rather, the point is that researchers 
must be more careful in describing their aims and understanding of democracy when they 
study this relationship. In particular, they should avoid the conceptual fallacy of confusing 
a (contingent) democratizing effect of populism with the question of its democratic nature. 
Here, they should in addition be careful to clarify whether the democratic standards that 
they apply come from a populistic or another conception of democracy. Moreover, they 
should avoid the normative and prescriptive fallacy of promoting populism as democratic 
because it is has democratic effects (in particular circumstances). In the next section, I 
propose that we can better understand these issues by explicating and applying a publicity 
condition to and a participant perspective on populism. 
 
III. The publicity condition 
The publicity condition was first proposed by Kant and later elaborated by Rawls. This 
sections shows how it is relevant for the assessment of populism. It might seem misplaced 
to apply a notion most often used to assess theories of justice to a political phenomenon 
such as populism but I believe my analysis will show that the application is pertinent. 
Kant introduces the publicity condition in the second appendix to “Toward 
Perpetual Peace” (Kant 1996, 347-351). Its object is “every claim to a right,” which Kant 
says must have the “capacity for publicity” (Kant 1996, 347). Hence, “All actions relating 
to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity” (Kant 1996, 
347). Rawls (1999, 115) presents publicity as one of the formal constraints of right.4 The 
publicity condition holds that the principles and rules one promotes for common affairs 
should be capable of being publically recognized and accepted. The ideas behind the 
principles and the demands that they impose on us should be capable of being known and 
applied by everyone. As Rawls (1999, 158) puts it, a conception of justice must be capable 
of being “publically accepted and followed as the fundamental charter of society.” 
The publicity condition is not merely an universalizability test; that is, it is not only 
a matter of a doctrine being capable of being followed by everyone. The publicity condition 
adds the idea that it must be possible for it to be common knowledge that the doctrine in 
                                                          
4 I refer to the publicity condition as presented A Theory of Justice and do not consider or include the 
restrictions on public reason suggested by Rawls in Political Liberalism. 
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question is universally followed. Political doctrines must be publically proclaimable and 
communicable. Hence, publicity of public rules entails that citizens know their rights and 
duties, the principles that support them, the ideas behind them, and the arguments for them. 
Part of the argument for the publicity condition is that insofar as a political doctrine 
aims to be the basis of state power and coercion, it should be able to be publically 
scrutinized. That is, it should offer itself to public discussion and justification. Political 
power should not be based on delusions or deceptions (Rawls 1996, 68).5 The moral basis 
of this argument is the idea that citizens should respect one another as belonging to the 
same public and as capable of understanding and responding to reasons. Only political 
doctrines that are made public and can be publically discussed treats everyone as free, equal, 
and reason-responsive persons. Thus, publicity has the social function of making possible 
mutually respectful public discussion (Freeman 2007, 6, 12, 16). Moreover, only if the 
doctrine that governs society is publically known can citizens learn from the ideal it 
promotes and be motivated by it (Rawls 1996, 71). If we cannot want everyone in society 
to learn from and be motivated by our doctrine, it fails in terms of publicity.  
The Kantian publicity principle is closely related to the notion of “the public.” A 
doctrine aiming for political power and thus affecting the rights of others should be 
communicable to and known by the public. The public in Kant is composed of everyone 
capable of reason (García-Marzá 2012, 103-4; O’Neill 1989, 33, 35). By making one’s 
intensions and principles public and by communicating them to everyone, one shows 
respect for others as engaged in a shared enterprise. The publicity condition, therefore, 
excludes esoteric doctrines, which are doctrines that are (1) communicable only to part of 
the public, and which (2) can only achieve their aims by not being publically communicated. 
In contrast to esotericism, the publicity condition is based on respect for and trust in the 
understanding of ordinary people for political affairs (Luban 1996: 154-56). 
The preceding points should make it clear that lack of publicity is more a moral than 
an epistemic shortcoming. In Kant and Rawls, a doctrine should not only be judged in terms 
of its epistemic content but also in terms of the relationship between people that it creates 
by being made public. Ambivalence, obscurity, and self-contradiction of doctrines are 
objectionable because of the relationship these features create to those subjected to them. 
Especially if the ambivalence is used for strategic purposes and is required for the success 
of the doctrine, this undermines relations of equal and mutual respect. It does so because it 
fails to treat others as free, equal, and reason responsive agents engaged in a shared public 
enterprise. 
                                                          
5 There is an issue of hypothetical versus actual publicity here, which I cannot go into. While Kant’s 
main formulations entail capacity for publicity, Rawls’ argument also often requires actual publicity. 
Note here that the fact that a doctrine is made public is not sufficient to show that it has the capacity 
for publicity, which is the issue I focus on in relation to populism. 
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It is instructive for the application to populism to see how Rawls uses the publicity 
condition in his criticism of utilitarianism. Rawls (1999, 157) argues that adopting the 
principle of utility as a public conception of justice would undermine some citizens’ self-
respect, because this principle “requires some who are less fortunate to accept even lower 
life prospects for the sake of others.” If a citizen knows that she is worse off for the sake 
of others and if she knows that everyone knows this, this will harm her self-respect. She 
will, rightly, feel that she is being used as a means to the end of others, and this feeling will 
be even worse because she knows that everyone knows this. Moreover, when one’s self-
respect is undermined, this also undermines one’s respect for the interests of others (Luban 
1996: 167). Rawls therefore considers the strategy of increasing average utility by choosing 
another set of principles, such as Rawls’ two principles of justice, as the public principles. 
But in that case, what is being chosen are Rawls’ principles and not the principle of utility. 
“If … the public recognition of utilitarianism entails some loss of self-esteem, there is no 
way around this drawback” (Rawls 1999, 158). Thus, the publicity condition forbids that 
one chooses one set of principles (e.g. Rawls’ two principles of justice) and then uses another 
principle (here the principle of utility) to assess justice in society. 
The core of Rawls’ publicity argument against utilitarianism is that we cannot share 
one set of principles as the public charter of society and then have another set of principles 
as the standards we use to assess whether our society is just or not. We cannot proclaim 
that we have chosen to have our society regulated by conception A and then use conception 
B to assess whether our society is just. For then we have actually chosen B to regulate our 
society. If we believe B to be the right doctrine, then B must be both the public charter of 
society and the theory used to assess the justice of society. If choosing B as the public 
conception of justice undermines B’s end, then B has failed the publicity condition and 
therefore should not be chosen. The publically proclaimed doctrine and the actually applied 
doctrine must be the same. 
The publicity condition, then, requires two things of us. First, it requires us to ensure 
that the doctrine we promote and the principles we use to assess the effects of the former 
are the same. If the principles we use to assess the effects of the doctrine we promote are 
opposed to the principles of the doctrine itself, it means that the latter has failed the 
publicity condition. Second, the publicity condition asks us to ensure that public recognition 
of the doctrine we promote does not frustrate its end. If a doctrine cannot be publically 
recognized without effacing its value, it has failed the publicity condition. 
So how does populism fare if subjected to the publicity condition? Can it be made 
the publically communicated, accepted, and generally followed doctrine for society and still 
achieve its end? Subjecting populism to the publicity condition is not as straightforward as 
Rawls’ subjection of utilitarianism to the same. This is the case because populism is not an 
elaborate and clear moral theory in the way utilitarianism is. It might for this reason be 
thought that it is a category mistake to subject populism to the publicity condition. 
However, what I subject to the publicity condition are not populist movements or parties 
9 
 
but theoretical defenses of populism. More specifically, my object of analysis are theories 
of populism that seek to establish a positive connection between populism and democracy. 
Such theories can be seen as political doctrines, because they promote a set of ideas about 
how society ought to be organized. By praising populism, they endorse alternative 
interpretations of key aspects of democracy, such as the meaning of popular sovereignty, 
democratic legitimacy, and how to relate to political opponents. Thus, when I ask whether 
populism has the capacity to be publically recognized, I speak of whether these theories of 
populism and democracy are some that can be publically communicate in conjunction with 
populist ideas of democracy and how to engage with political opponents. We can ask this 
question both with regard to empirical and historical theories that speak of populism as a 
corrective for democracy and normative theories that see populism as necessary for 
revitalizing, deepening, and radicalizing democracy. 
In the empirical literature, some commentators praise populism for its ability to give 
voice and influence to otherwise marginalized groups (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 196-99). 
Thus, this literature posits inclusiveness as a central normative principle. Applying the 
publicity condition to this theory, we must ask whether a populist can make inclusiveness a 
public rule. This would require that the populist speak out in favor of inclusion of all 
marginalized groups in the political process. It is not sufficient to say that your own group 
has been marginalized and should now be included, which populist leaders often do. The 
populist must make it a public principle that marginalized groups should be heard and their 
concerns included. However, this opens up for the possibility of other groups claiming to 
be marginalized and speaking out against the populist leader. Indeed, it entails that 
disagreements are articulated and should be respected. The question is whether one can 
allow for this while remaining a committed populist. The fact is that populists not only do not 
promote inclusion as a general and public principle, they also cannot do so. Populism only 
work as a public strategy by excluding some views as illegitimate. Thus, the problem is that 
the theorist of populism promotes a principle (inclusiveness), which is not – and which 
cannot be – the publically proclaimed end of populism itself. 
Empirical theorists can reply that they are not promoting populism but only showing 
a causal relationship, that is, that their aim is not normative but explanatory. My point is 
that this is not sufficient. Also in explanatory political science and history, one must be clear 
on the norms one invokes. By speaking of populism as “a corrective for democracy,” one 
assumes a norm of democracy to which the correction must conform. The problem that 
becomes apparent when applying the publicity condition to populism is that the norm – the 
correct end – that the theorist of populism and democracy applies a norm that a populist 
cannot publically endorse and still remain populistic. 
Let us turn to Mouffe’s unequivocally normative and prescriptive theory of populism 
and democracy. As mentioned, Mouffe is in favor of (left) populism because it creates 
conflict, politicization, and breaks up “the consensus of the center.” Thus, Mouffe’s theory 
of populism posits a conflictual understanding of democracy as the end to be realized. This 
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conflict should be of a specific kind, which Mouffe calls “agonistic pluralism.” This is a 
form of conflict where one does not treat the opponent as an enemy to be eradicated, as in 
antagonistic conflict, but rather as a legitimate adversary who has a right to defend her 
opinions (Mouffe 2009, 101-105; 2018, 90-93). The question raised with the publicity 
condition is whether one publically can proclaim populist ideas and a commitment to the 
end of agonistic pluralism. The publicity condition requires that one make one’s end public; 
thus, Mouffe must when promoting populism make public that her end is agonistic 
pluralism. This end, however, is in tension with two aspects of populism, as we see it in 
practice and as it is understood by Laclau, who Mouffe claims to be following, namely 
antagonism and the aim of establishing a new consensus. As a strategy, populism works by 
creating antagonism, by describing the opponent as an enemy to be eradicated and not as a 
legitimate adversary. And the end of populism is creating a new consensus – a new 
hegemony in their Gramscian parlance. Populists use antagonism to mobilize the people 
and claim their end is creating a new unity based on the will of the authentic people. The 
strategy of antagonism and the promise of rule by the unitary people go hand in hand in 
populism, and they would both be frustrated by the public proclamation of the idea that the 
actual aim is establishing a democracy characterized by agonistic pluralism. 
Consider next Laclau’s defense of populism. According to him, the populist division 
between the people and the elite is not something given or natural but a political 
construction. “The people” is constituted by the logic of populism itself (Laclau 2005, 72-
3, 74-7, 90, 99). Laclau justifies populist movements and leaders as necessary for creating a 
potent force, which can establish a new hegemony. Moreover, a populist movement 
achieves unity on Laclau’s account not by agreeing on a substantive just cause but by uniting 
around a discursively produced empty signifier; at the limit, “by a pure name: the name of 
the leader” (Laclau 2015: 157). Can this theory be made public without self-frustration?  
For followers of populism, the legitimacy of populist demands rests on the belief that 
society actually is divided into two camps, and that the populist leader has discovered and 
expresses the just demands of the people. The notions that there really is no people and 
that there is no substantive just cause that unites them are hardly part of the self-
understanding of the followers – or of populism as an ideology (Canovan 2002; Mudde 
2017) – and thus not a position that a populist leader can communicate publically without 
frustrating his or her own end. If this is true and Laclau’s theory is made public and the 
people are told that they are a political construction and their cause is a pure name, then 
their potency will fail and they will not become a strong people. In other words, if the people 
believe their leader does not express their authentic will but artificially creates it, then they 
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will not follow the leader, and the populist movement will break down.6 Thus, if made 
public, Laclau’s theory of populism frustrates its own end. It fails the publicity condition. 
The populist theories of Laclau and Mouffe cannot be addressed to all of us, or the 
public in the Kantian sense of all persons capable of reason. They can be addressed only to 
populist leaders and strategists. Clearly, they cannot be addressed to the opponent or the 
elite, who is regarded as illegitimate and outside the people of concern (Laclau 2005, 86). 
But, as we have just seen, they also cannot be addressed to the followers. 
A core idea behind the publicity condition is the idea that the principles that one 
professes should be the same principles, which one uses to evaluate the effects of the 
former. Otherwise, one separates oneself from the public. Thus, if one publically promotes 
populism and thereby its understanding of democracy, one should also evaluate the effects 
of promoting populism with populist standards. It contradicts the publicity condition to 
evaluate the effects of promoting populism with liberal democratic standards or with 
reference to the value of inclusiveness or pluralism. Most commentators agree that populists 
do not regard the latter as fundamental values (Arato and Cohen 2017, 285-87; Mudde 2017; 
Müller 2016; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2019). Indeed, populism promotes homogeneity and 
unity, not difference and pluralism. Thus, this praise of populism uses standards that are 
not only foreign to but also directly opposed to populism. 
Laclau and Mouffe might insist that their populism is committed to pluralism 
(Mouffe 2018, 62-3). But consider two questions. First, if their populism as a set of ideas and 
normative commitments is so different from what everyone else calls “populism,” why call it 
“populism” at all?7 Second, is populism as a logic of articulation compatible with pluralism? 
Laclau argues that because a populist movement is unified around an empty signifier – that 
is, because it has no substantive content – it is compatible with a plurality of demands 
(Laclau 2015, 263). In practice, however, every populist movement or party will at some 
point need to take sides on some substantive issues and, if it gains power, to implement 
some policies rather than others. Mouffe and Laclau fail to explain how such decisions are 
to be made in a way that respects disagreement within and beyond the party. They and the 
populist leader have nothing to say to those people who do not see themselves as reflected 
in the populist party and disagree with its policies (Ochoa Espejo 2015, 74). The populist 
logic of articulation, its way of creating a people, is exactly one that works by – and only 
works by – not revealing, communicating, or, indeed, making public disagreements among 
the people.8 
                                                          
6 In this formulation, I borrow from Luban’s (1996: 160) application of the publicity condition. It 
might be objected that people can follow a leader for purely strategic reasons without believing his 
messages. This is true, but then they are no longer committed populists. 
7 Mouffe (2018, 81-2) attempts an answer. 
8 In a detailed discussion of Laclau’s theory of populism, Benjamin L. McKean (2016) shows how 
Laclau implies that the idea of the unifying empty signifier of populism is neutral and something 
everyone can equally submit to. McKean convincingly argues both that populist notions of the 
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In sum, the discussed theories of populism fail the two requirements of the publicity 
condition. First, the praised doctrine (populism) is not the same as the doctrine used to 
assess its affects (liberal democracy and agonistic pluralism). Second, the theories are 
publically self-frustrating: they cannot be publically proclaimed without thwarting their 
ends. Populism is praised for its inclusiveness or ability to politicize and bring in dissenting 
voices. But populism only works as a public strategy by not mentioning actual disagreements 
and dissent among the groups it seeks to unite. 
 
IV. The observer and the participant perspective 
This section suggests that the shortcomings of the discussed theories have their roots in 
their taking an observer perspective on the relationship between populism and democracy. 
The observer takes a detached perspective on politics and discusses populism as a 
phenomenon that affects democracy from the outside rather than as a competing set of 
ideas about democracy. She regards populism as a form of treatment that have certain 
effects on the people and democracy. And she asks if this treatment is good or bad, a 
necessary corrective or a dangerous threat, a way to motivate radical change or not. 
The main drawback of taking the observer perspective in political theory is that it 
entails a failure actually to discuss political principles or conceptions of democracy on their 
merits. By treating populism as a treatment or a means, we fail to interrogate its conception 
of democracy. If we evaluate populism only as an external instrument, which affects 
democracy from the outside and as a phenomenon that appears within the liberal democracy 
framework, we fail to understand that the issue of populism is about liberal democracy.9 
I want to propose that a central idea behind the publicity condition is that we should 
take a participant perspective with regard to the ideas and principles we promote.10 That is, the 
publicity condition entails that when we propose and promote some ideas and principles, 
we do so as participants involved in relationships with other human beings to whom these 
principles should apply. We see the principles as principles we think it right to communicate 
to others and for our society to be regulated by. Promoting a political doctrine entails 
establishing a certain relationship to both our followers and our political opponents. The 
publicity condition concerns the character of these relationships and is based on the norm 
that such relationships should exhibit respect for everyone as engaged in a common 
practice. Publicity matters because of its potential of making all affected into participants in 
a joint enterprise in a way that expresses mutual respect. 
                                                          
people are never actually neutral, most often they are racialized, and that internal differences in 
Laclau’s populism must be seen as threat to unity rather than a resource. 
9 ”Populism has a somewhat different status from other ideologies, being derived from its reaction 
to the institutions themselves rather than to the debate within those institutions.” (Taggart 2002, 
79). 
10 The notion of the participant perspective and the contrast to the observer perspective is inspired 
by Peter Strawson’s (1982) distinction between the participant attitude and the objective attitude. 
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The participant perspective entailed by the publicity condition differs from an 
observer perspective where one asks how some ideas and principles can be used to explain 
or predict behavior. The publicity condition requires that we see proposed principles as 
principles for us to make our own and act on, rather than as principles that affect us as external 
causes.11 From the detached perspective of the observer, there is nothing wrong in giving 
people one set of principles or society one public charter as external stimuli and then 
consider the effects of this treatment according to some other conception of the right. It is 
the participant who cannot accept this division. The participant cannot see a set of 
principles as her principles, as principles she has reason to accept, and at the same time 
regard them as a treatment the effects of which should be assessed with some other set of 
principles. First, participants do not see their principles as treatments. Second, if they did, 
they would not have the intended effect. Third, if a participant endorses a set of principles, 
for her, these principles should be used to assess their own effects. Otherwise, she could 
not say that the former are principles that she has endorsed. 
Note that the participant perspective is not merely the perspective of someone who 
participates in an activity, for example, politics, but the perspective of someone who 
participates as a participant. It is the perspective of someone who is fully committed to being 
involved in a public – open and shared – activity, who does so while acknowledging being 
one of multiple partakers, and who does not detach herself from the activity to observe, 
explain, manipulate and/or exploit it. Hence, non-detachment and the acknowledgement 
of being a part of an activity you share with others as fellow participants are two core aspects 
of the participant perspective. 
The involvement of the participant entails a double commitment. On the one hand, 
it entails a first-order commitment to your own particular opinions. The participant is an 
engaged actor who seeks to further her own ideas and principles. On the other hand, the 
participant perspective entails a second-order commitment to being only a part of a larger 
enterprise, to acting with others as one participant among many. Thus, as a participant you 
acknowledge what Hannah Arendt (1989: 8, 175-76) calls “plurality,” that is, you 
acknowledge being engaged in a shared practice with others, who are both identical to you, 
participants, and distinct from you, because you are different parts with different positions. 
Moreover, the participant views herself as an actor in the active and reflective sense 
of someone who deliberates about what to do, rather than a part that simply follows the 
flow. Thus, the participant perspective is a practical perspective in the Kantian sense of a 
standpoint from which you deliberate about what to do. Taking this together with the earlier 
two aspects – non-detachment and the acknowledgement of being a part of an activity you 
share with others as fellow participants – we can say that you take the participant perspective 
                                                          
11 The idea that moral arguments are addresses to us as deliberating agents rather than arguments 
about us is a key idea in Kant’s practical philosophy (Korsgaard 1996, xii; Rostbøll 2011, 388-89). 
14 
 
when you regard yourself as involved with others in a common enterprise of deliberation, 
choice, and action.  
There are some important presuppositions and implications involved in taking the 
participant perspective. First, as a participant you regard yourself as a deliberating, choosing, 
and acting being. Hence, the participant perspective presupposes that you regard yourself 
as capable of deliberation and free to act on the basis of reasons. In addition, as a participant 
in an activity with other participants, you regard not only yourself but also the other 
participants as responsive to reasons, free, and autonomous.  
Second, as involved with others in a practical enterprise where everyone views one 
another as free and responsive to reasons, participants will consider each other’s ideas and 
principles as something they have reason to hold and promote. Political doctrines, thus, will 
be considered as something the participants advance in good faith and for good reasons. 
We can only regard people’s views as product of self-interest and corruption (as populists 
do) from an observer perspective. When disagreement arises, from the participant 
perspective this will be considered as reasonable disagreement, in the sense of a 
disagreement that can arise even when people in good faith apply their reason to complex 
practical issues.12 Yet, as an engaged actor with first-order commitments, the participant 
will not merely observe the fact of disagreement, but will promote and struggle for her own 
opinions. To remain a participant, however, this promotion or struggle must happen in a 
way that regards others as participants who also reasonably and in good faith promote their 
ideas. 
This entails, third, that the participants assess ideas, opinions, and ideologies on their 
merits. Participants consider their own and others’ doctrines as something they believe in 
and have good reasons to find true and right. When you begin to consider others’ and your 
own ideas either as caused by external factors or as treatments that affect people from the 
outside (as populists do), you have left the participant perspective and become an observer. 
Accordingly, the participant as a participant is primarily concerned with the conditions 
of remaining a participant, which requires upholding the participant perspective and 
including others as participants, because one cannot be a participant without having co-participants. 
Normative evaluation from the participant perspective should not be confused with 
internal critique, that is, critique that accepts and applies the norms of the ideology under 
evaluation. Thus, taking the participant perspective regarding the issue of democracy and 
populism does not mean that any assessment of populism must be internal or any critique 
of populism must be an internal critique, in the sense of applying populist norms and 
standards to the evaluation of the problem of populism and democracy.  
From the participant perspective, the convictions of the one making the evaluation 
matters, that is, it matters whether you are convinced by populist ideas or not. The publicity 
condition of the participant perspective requires of the populist that she applies populist norms 
                                                          
12 Cf. Rawls (1996: 54-8) on the burdens of judgment. 
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or a populist understanding of democracy to the assessment of the relationship between 
populism and democracy. It is entailed by the participant perspective that the non-populist, 
as a participant, will assume that the populist as a fellow participant is committed to 
populism and a populist understanding of democracy. But the non-populist is of course 
free to assess and criticize populism with her own, non-populist principles, standards, and 
conception of democracy.  
The participant perspective requires that populists and non-populists discuss 
populism and other doctrines on their merits, as competing conceptions of democracy. This 
is possible only if populists and non-populists alike make public and communicates the 
principles to which they are committed.  
The question raised by the publicity condition, then, is whether the reason why we 
promote a doctrine can be made public and be accepted from within the participant 
perspective. This requires that populist theorists can and do make public why they think it 
is valuable to promote populism in a way that can be recognized and accepted by followers 
of populism. Followers of populism are from the participant perspective people who believe 
in the rightness of populist ideas and principles. Thus, when I engage with a populist as a 
participant, I take her on her word as someone who believes that society is dived into two 
antagonistic camps and that the people is a unity whose will should be expressed 
immediately and directly in political decisions. Laclau and Mouffe accept that populists 
speak in this way but do not engage with the validity of these ideas in themselves but rather, 
in their defense of populism, make us look at how these ideas motivate people and the 
consequences the ideas have in terms of politicization, conflict, and change. In this way, 
they create a sharp division between their own defense of populism and the reasons people 
as participants believe to have for supporting populism. Consequently, followers of populism 
cannot see themselves in the praise of populism that we find in these theories. 
It is by creating divergence between the ideas that are proclaimed (e.g. that the 
people is a unity and morally right) and the reasons for doing so (its motivational and 
politicizing effects), that theories of populism such as those of Laclau and Mouffe’s fail the 
publicity condition. The cost is that it undercuts the participant perspective from which 
citizens can engage and discuss their different conceptions of democracy on their merits. 
When ideas and principles such as those defining populism are reduced to means with 
certain effects, we have taken them out of the common public sphere where citizens can 
discuss them as ideas and principles about how to understand democracy. 
It may be objected that I have not discussed populism on its own terms. But my 
point is exactly that this is not possible, because you cannot participate with someone who 
rejects to participate as a fellow participant. Populists complain that their opponent – non-
populists or “the elite” – do not listen to their concerns but by failing to adhere to the 
publicity condition and taking a participant perspective, they deny their adversaries the 
opportunity of doing so. Indeed, the latter might exactly be their strategy. On the one hand, 
populists demand respect for the concerns of “the people,” and on the other hand, they do 
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so in a way that undercuts the common standpoint from which alone citizens can engage 
in mutually respectful interaction. This might be a strategically clever move if your aim is 
winning a battle but it fails to express – embody, communicate, make public – the kind of 
democratic process that it aims to establish. Or, it fails to express which kind of democratic 
relations, it aims to establish. In short, the populist strategy instantiates another kind of 
interpersonal relations than those its defenders claim to be fighting for, or it becomes 
unclear what it aims for. 
 
V. Populism as democratic ideology 
It might be objected that the preceding argument misunderstands the nature of populism 
and that populism does not have the content necessary to treat it as a doctrine that can be 
subjected to the publicity condition. Thus, some scholars argue that populism is not an 
ideology or a fixed constellation of ideas. Rather, they say, populism is a logic, a mutable set 
of discursive or rhetorical resources, or a political style that can be put to different uses 
(Brubaker 2017; Kazin 2017, 1-5; Laclau 2005, 176; Moffitt 2016; Mouffe 2018, 10-11). 
While many other writers on populism and I agree that populism is not a thick ideology 
such as liberalism or socialism, we also contend that populism contains some ideas and 
principles of its own and that it is these ideas that constitute populism. Populism has for 
this reason been described as a thin ideology (Abts and Rummens 2007, 407-9; Canovan 
2002, 32; Mudde 2017, 30). Whereas a thick ideology speaks to a broad menu of socio-
political issue, the thin ideology of populism includes a narrower and more restricted set of 
core ideas and concepts. 
The thin ideology of populism is primarily a set of ideas about politics and 
democracy. Populism presents itself as the ideology of democracy and provides its own 
interpretation of the meaning and practice of democracy (Canovan 2002, 30-33; Urbinati 
2014, 128-70; 2019). We can understand populism in terms of its understanding of three 
elements. (1) The circumstances of politics: society is divided into two qualitatively different and 
antagonistic camps, the people and the elite. (2) Logic of politics: democratic politics is about 
winning power back to the people from an untrustworthy elite. (3) Notion of democratic 
legitimacy: political power should be an expression of the united will of the authentic people 
(Rostbøll 2018). This set of ideas and principles is not empty, formal, or innocent. It carries 
with it substantial normative content and promotes a specific view of how we ought to 
understand and engage in democratic politics. In particular, it supplies and promotes an 
understanding of society, politics, and democracy, which stands in opposition to and 
competes with liberal democracy (Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2019). It is for this reason that 
I think populism has the content that makes it incumbent on us to submit it to the publicity 
condition. 
You might object that apologists and promoters of populism only praise or want to 
employ the energies of populism, because these correct or deepen democracy. The former 
do not want to establish a populist regime. Thus, we saw that empirical political scientists 
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and historians commend populism for its positive effects mainly when populists are in 
opposition, or they praise populist movements that do not want to occupy state power as 
opposed to populist parties that do want to occupy state power (Gratan 2016; Kazin 2017). 
Mouffe promotes populism because of its affective and motivating dimension, while she 
maintains that the aim is not to establish a populist regime (Mouffe 2018, 38, 50-51, 71-78, 
80). However, there is something strange in being “for populism” while not being for its 
victory. This is especially a problem in a normative account such as Mouffe’s. She might 
reply that one cannot be for a populist regime because populism has no “programmatic 
content” (Mouffe 2018, 11). But what then, exactly, is she for? The effects of populism, it 
seems. If that is the case, she and those who share her project have to be much more careful 
in showing when and where populism has the desired effects. In particular, they should 
consider whether they could achieve the same effects with other means and, thus, without 
the dangers of populism (Arato and Cohen 2017, 287). Moreover, Mouffe’s support for 
populist parties and leaders places her not merely as a supporter of a social movement that 
criticizes political power from without but makes her promote populist leadership that aims 
to conquer political power.13 
The publicity condition applies to any doctrine that is defended and promoted in 
politics. The ideas and principles that a political party use and act on should be capable of 
being publically recognized (White and Ypi 2016, chaps. 1 and 3). In a democracy, an 
ideological project should both be able to explain and defend its substantive policy 
proposals and the relations it creates to followers and opponents by advancing them. 
Populism does not have its own substantive policy proposals but depends on a “host 
ideology” for these (Mudde 2017, 30-31, 36-38). But populists have ideas about how they 
themselves – or “the people” – should relate to their adversaries, make decision against 
them, and advance their substantive policies, whatever they might be (Rostbøll 2018). It is 
the latter that makes populism special and gives it problems in terms of fulfilling the 
publicity condition. The unique problem of populism arises because of its ambivalent 
relationship to democracy. On the one hand, populism wears the democratic mantle and, 
on the other hand, it promotes ideas and principles that if they became publically recognized 
would subvert democratic practice. 
 
VI. Publicity, politicization, and conflict 
In the first chapter of A Theory of Justice, Rawls cites a number of reasons why it is valuable 
with a public conception of justice: It (1) creates a common frame of discussion, (2) it 
establishes bonds of civic friendship, (3) it helps avoid that people pursue unjust ends, (4) 
it tends to eliminate distrust, hostility and resentment, and (5) it reduces disagreement 
(Rawls 1999, 4-6, 46). Some readers worry that the aim of establishing a common and shared 
                                                          
13 For the distinction between populism as social movement and as a government form, see Urbinati 
2014, 129-31; 2019, 6.8. 
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conception of justice for society can have depoliticizing effects. In particular, they object 
that reducing disagreement amounts to suppressing dissent and avoiding necessary political 
conflict and change. Some even argue that mutual trust and lack of resentment can 
contribute to a status quo bias and the perpetuation of unjust institutions (McCormick 
2011). One of the arguments in favor of populism is that it is democratizing because it 
introduces conflict, mobilizes otherwise excluded groups of society, and challenges the 
status quo. Populism breaks the existing consensus, opposes technocracy, and “there is no 
alternative” politics. It effects a necessary politicization of issues that have been suppressed 
or ignored and brings the concerns of “the people” to the agenda (Canovan 2002; Laclau 
2005; Mouffe 2018; Stavrakakis 2015). In response, I argue that not all forms of 
politicization and conflict are equally conducive for democracy and I defend the publicity 
condition in relation to this point. 
Rawls’ list of goods connected to a shared and public conception of justice are some 
of those goods that many commentators agree are lacking in contemporary politics. Take 
the issue of common discussion. Proponents and defenders of populism praise it for 
bringing in new voices and concerns. However, populism itself prevents society from 
having a productive discussion of the issues it brings up. The fundamental reason for this 
is that populists do not bring issues to the political agenda as substantive issues about which 
there can be reasonable disagreement. They bring them forth as the concerns of the people, 
which for them excludes the need for policy argument and justification (Weale 2018, 114). 
The problem is a fundamental one, namely that populism promotes an understanding of 
politics, in which politics is not about debating or reconciling differences of opinion but of 
antagonism between different identity groups. If you disagree with populist demands, you 
cannot respond by way of policy argument, for the political logic introduced by populism 
has transformed the conflict into something different. The conflict now concerns whether 
or not you are for or against the people, or which group you belong to, the people or the 
elite (Moffitt 2016, 148). Populism creates conflict and a type of politicization, but it does 
not generate productive policy discussion. Thus, if the antagonism introduced by populists 
leads to change, there is no way of assessing whether it has been for the better, since the 
conflict has included no deliberation on substantive matters. For example, some praise 
right-wing populists for having brought immigration to the agenda in Europe, but they fail 
to note how the populistic logic has silenced those who oppose stricter immigration laws. 
Pro-immigration is seen as an elite position and this in the populist logic is sufficient to 
discredit it. 
We can connect this point to the publicity condition. The populist at best promotes 
a form of private or partial reason, as understood by Kant (O’Neill 1989). The latter is a 
form of reason that appeals to an unquestioned authority, in this case “the people.” It is not 
a full or public use of reason, because the authority of the people is given. Populism bars 
us from questioning the moral authority and rightness of the will of the people – as the 
latter is interpreted by the populist leader. You might ask, if it isn’t a principle of democracy 
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that the people should have ultimate authority. But the principle of democracy is that “the 
people” or the majority has the right to decide, not that everyone should accept that those 
who win the vote are morally correct (Estlund 2008, 104; Rostbøll 2008, 195). In populist 
politics, those who disagree with the populist demands are simply told that the latter express 
the will of the people. 
Laclau and Mouffe may respond that the existing “consensus of the center” has also 
not been justified to everyone. This may be true. However, it is something to be determined 
by empirical investigation guided by norms of proper justification. To assess Laclau and 
Mouffe’s claim, we must analyze the type of agreement that exist in society and how it has 
been reached. It is difficult to understand why consensus should be bad in and of itself. 
Consensus becomes objectionable only if it is not a genuine consensus, that is, if it is reached 
by suppressing certain views and alternatives and is not the result of a genuine debate 
(Rostbøll 2008, 23-27, 148-49). Laclau and Mouffe do seem to think suppression of conflict 
is bad – at least when done by their opponent. What is unclear is what they would regard as 
a legitimate way of reaching agreement, if anything. They provide no way of normatively 
distinguishing between different populist projects, except for rhetorical and emotional 
success (Arato 2013, 165; Ochoa Espejo 2015, 72-74; Urbinati 2019, 6.8; Valdivielso 2017, 
304, 307). 
Mouffe rightly notes that political conflict and adversarialism are essential for giving 
citizens the opportunity to choose between different political projects. But in defending 
populism, she fails to acknowledge that only types of partisanship that are committed to 
public justification allow different political projects to be scrutinized, compared, and 
subjected to trial by discussion (White and Ypi 2016, 22n55, 55, 64, 76-77). 
Consider next Rawls’ point that it speaks in favor of a public and shared conception 
of justice that it reduces disagreement. Here I propose that we distinguish between 
disagreement and polarization, and that only the latter is a problem for a well-functioning 
democracy. Disagreement concerns substantive issues of policy and is simply a difference 
of opinion among people about which public policies our society should pursue. 
Polarization does not primarily concern substantive issue of policy but rather to which camp 
you belong. A society characterized by disagreement is a society in which people regard 
themselves as having different opinions. This may make them divide into different groups, 
for example, political parties, interest groups, or social movements. A society characterized 
by polarization, by contrast, is one in which people see themselves as belonging to different 
and antagonistic groups. In the latter case, the group identification is prior to and more 
important than substantial disagreement. You belong to group A and therefore you disagree 
with the views of group B. 
It is polarization and not disagreement that is detrimental to democracy. 
Disagreement and dissent are necessary for productive discussion and necessary change. 
Polarization obstructs discussion and hinders change (Hopkins and Sides 2015; Persily 
2015). Polarization as defined here is not extreme disagreement. When citizens and/or 
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politicians become polarized, they no longer view one another merely as disagreeing others 
with whom one must deliberate, negotiate, and make compromises. The other becomes an 
enemy who must be defeated, silenced, and eliminated. The polarization logic is one that 
disconnects us from the participant perspective entailed by the publicity condition. From 
the latter perspective, we view others and ourselves as moved by reasons that can be made 
public and are sharable (not necessarily shared). We try to influence others through reasons 
that can be made public. In this way, the publicity condition entails that we view one another 
as engaged in a cooperative enterprise. Disagreement on policy is fully compatible with this 
engagement, while polarization is not. The issue, then, is whether the parties regard 
themselves as engaged in a shared enterprise. If they do not, conflict loses its democratic 
value. 
My argument does entail the value of reducing disagreement on one level. The 
publicity condition, as presented here, entails agreement on the value of being engaged in a 
joint political enterprise. Moreover, it implies a norm of mutual respect for persons as 
capable of forming their own opinions and being responsive to reasons. This commitment 
should not be seen as limiting first-order disagreement but rather as an explanation for why 
the latter should be respected. We should distinguish between second-order commitments 
to toleration, deliberation, and compromise and first-order policy commitments. We can 
have strong disagreements on the first-order level of policy and still be committed to shared 
norms for how one ought to relate to disagreeing others and how one ought to make 
decisions with them (Rostbøll 2018). To be sure, second-order commitments to toleration, 
deliberation, and compromise do set limits to acceptable first-order commitments. Some 
first-order policy views entail rejection of norms that also set them at odds with the second-
order commitments entailed by the Kantian publicity condition, most clearly views that 
reject a fundamental commitment to respect human equality. In this way, the publicity 
condition does and should reduce disagreement. 
Incidentally, Mouffe’s own distinction between antagonism and agonism actually 
accepts the need for avoiding some types of disagreement and polarization. According to 
Mouffe, the aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonistic relations between 
enemies into agonistic pluralism. The latter requires that one treat one’s opponent as a 
legitimate adversary rather than an enemy (Mouffe 2009, 101-105; 2018, 90-93). This 
position depends on consensus about liberal democratic values of freedom, equality, and 
mutual toleration, which Mouffe partly recognizes (Mouffe 2009, 103-4; 1998, 93). What I 
do not see is how this defense of agonistic pluralism as opposed to antagonistic politics is 
compatible with Mouffe’s promotion of populism. Not only actual populist parties but also 
Laclau’s theory of populism, which Mouffe endorses, have as their very core the idea of the 
existence or creation of an antagonistic relationship where the opponent is regarded as an 
enemy who has no legitimate place in the political community (Abts and Rummens 2007, 
419; Laclau 2005, 86; Müller 2016, 20; Rummens 2017, 562; Urbinati 2019, 6.10). 
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Moreover, while populism thrives on and may introduce conflict into the political system, 
the latter only happens as long as populism remains in opposition or operate as a grassroots 
movement contesting and criticizing political power. Populists in power tend to harm and 
suppress political opposition and contestation (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 196-99). The latter 
should come as no surprise because it follows directly from the populist understanding of 
what democracy is, allows, and even demands: that the people as a unity has its will 
implemented with no accommodation of opponents and with no constraints (Müller 2014, 
489).   
 
VII. Conclusion 
This article maintains that the publicity condition entails taking a participant perspective, 
and argues for some advantages of this perspective for assessing the issue of populism and 
democracy. However, my point is not that we as theorists or as citizens engaged in politics 
always and under all conditions should think as participants. My aim has been to show what 
is involved in taking the participant perspective and what is lost when we depart from this 
perspective, as I suggest theorists of populism often do.  
Under some conditions, it may be necessary to depart from the publicity requirement 
and the participant perspective for pragmatic reasons of political strategy. However, it is 
imperative that suspension of the participant attitude be done with great hesitation and is 
seen as a regrettable and temporary means with a clear purpose. A strategy of suspension 
of publicity and the participant perspective can only be justified if the aim is to make such 
suspension unnecessary or less necessary in the future.14 In other words, it is crucial that a 
strategy should be clearly demarcated as a strategy and not be confused with and promoted 
as an end. The problem with the discussed defenses of populism is either that they fail to 
clarify that populism is valued only as a strategy and not as an end, or that they fail to explain 
and justify what exactly populism is a strategy for. Moreover, if your defense of populism is 
only pragmatic, you need to be much more careful in explaining the conditions under which 
it will work. Otherwise, you end up with an indiscriminate praise of populism with no clear 
distinctions between means and ends, contingent effects and inherent value. 
In fact, I do not think populism is a strategy that can be defended as part of liberal 
democratic politics. The populist strategy entails such a fundamental break with the 
relations of publicity and justification that characterize a well-functioning liberal democracy 
that it would destroy it. Moreover, one cannot actually proclaim that one’s populism is only 
a strategy without it losing its force. A thoroughly populist strategy, which has no concern 
for publicity, justification, or accommodation of opponents, is if anything a revolutionary 
strategy (Rummens 2017, 562-63). Under some conditions, revolution might be necessary 
                                                          
14 In a different context, Strawson (1982, 75) writes, “suspension of ordinary moral reactive attitudes 
… is profoundly mitigated [when] the aim of the enterprise is to make the suspension unnecessary 
or less necessary.” 
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but it is naïve and irresponsible to believe that populism is an innocent strategy that is 
compatible with and can work “within the liberal democratic framework” (Mouffe 2018, 
80). Of course, not every populist party undermines the liberal democratic framework, but 
that is simply because not every populist party succeeds. However, if you really are a 
populist, we must as participants assume that you want to succeed with your populism. That 
is, that you are a populist like one is a revolutionary, as a means to the destruction of the 
existing regime. 
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